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THE AFL-CIO'S FIRST NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
By Arthur S. Leonard
Except for its endorsement of Robert LaFollette in 1924, the AFL stu-
diously avoided forming permanent alliances with the major parties
prior to the New Deal. Even then, its support for the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration was of an informal nature; many union leaders were
Republicans, and there was uneasiness in the organization about
becoming too closely tied to one party. The influence of the activist
CIO and the passage of Taft-Hartley by a Republican Congress over
Democrat Truman's veto helped to persuade AFL leaders to make an
endorsement in 1952. By the time of the 1956 election, the AFL-CIO
merger had taken place, with a consequent liberalization of the
political philosophy of the older organization.
In this article, Arthur Leonard discusses organized labor's role in the
precedent-setting 1956 campaign. The processes of assessment and
endorsement are examined, as well as labor's influence on the elec-
tion results. The crucial tactical decision of 1956, in the author's
opinion, was the move to endorse the head of the Democratic ticket
in order to strengthen the campaign for a Democratic Congress. The
author sees the resultant Democratic Congress in the light of a Repub-
lican Presidential landslide as evidence of the political sophistication
developed by organized labor in the 1950's.
Labor endorsed the Democratic nominees routinely in 1960, 1964,
and 1968. The activities of the 1956 campaign established precedents
that were to guide Labor through almost two decades of close involve-
ment with the Democratic Party.
Arthur S. Leonard is a junior in the New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations at Cornell University.--Editor.
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Introduction: The Special Significance of the 1956 Election
On September 23, 1952, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) broke
with a long-standing tradition and officially endorsed the national ticket
of a major party for the first time in its history. 1 As the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) has already endorsed the same candidates
on August 14, the two major labor confederations of the nation were in
the race together for the first time. 2  That the favored ticket of Stevenson
and Sparkman (Democratic) suffered a decisive electoral loss (442-89),3
and that a silent group -- representing about ten per cent of the AFL's
membership -- had not supported the convention's endorsement, 4 com-
bined with the 1955 AFL-CIO merger to produce a unique situation in 1956.
What would the newly united labor movement do? Would the leaders
recommend support for the Stevenson-Kefauver ticket in view of President
Eisenhower's overwhelming victory in 1952 and continued popularity?
Would the addition of CIO representatives to the more conservative AFL
Executive Council and General Board make a decisive difference in the
decision? Would labor's leaders be willing to make an endorsement
without the approval of a full-scale convention, which was not scheduled
in 1956?
These were among the questions facing political analysts as the presiden-
tial year began, and before the year was over the labor movement had
established patterns for political action that were to be followed for
at least three more national campaigns.
The Preconvention Political Situation in 1956
In 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower broke a chain of twenty years of Demo-
cratic administrations in a landslide victory. On February 29, 1956,
the President announced that, despite his illnesses of the past year,
he would run for re-election. 5 Adlai Stevenson had announced his own
candidacy for renomination in mid-November, 1955, but he was opposed
by Estes Kefauver and Averell Harriman, with Harriman receiving the
support of ex-President Harry S Truman. 6
COPE, the newly-formed Committee on Political Education of the AFL-
CIO, published its first election year Handbook early in the year, arti-
culating the positions voted in resolutions by the merger convention of
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the AFL-CIO in December 1955. 7 The disenchantment of organized labor
with, the Eisenhower Administration is evident throughout the Handbook,
and a final section, "The Problem With Eisenhower," gives labor's case
against the President:
A list of the bills passed or beaten by C ress reveals
a basic difference in the "philosophy" of thPresident
and the Democrats that makes effective action, under
the threat of possible veto, difficult.. .In reality, there
is scarcely a single major program where the basic ap -
proach of the... Democrats and the.. .businessmen sur-
rounding Eisenhower are not in conflict. This is the
real reason we got no action in either 1955 or 1956 on
bills to expand coverage of the federal minimum wage
to... 20 million workers now unprotected, grossly
underpaid and seriously overworked.8
However, tacitly admitting that Ike would probably be unbeatable if he
decided to run again, COPE's remedy for the problem was to elect a more
liberal Congress that might be able to override Presidential vetos. 9
In fact, this was very much the mood of labor in early 1956, if the anal-
ysts of the time can be trusted. A Newsweek poll of analysts revealed
that labor leaders preferred Stevenson over Eisenhower, 10 but indicated
that
(some) will (really work for Stevenson) but not so
strongly as in the past. The reason: Many union
leaders do not bel ieve Mr. Eisenhower can be
beaten, and they will concentrate on trying to elect
local candidates favorable to labor.11
This feeling was reflected in a resolution passed by the ILGWU in mid-
May, recommending no Presidential endorsement in 1956 unless there
was a really clear-cut choice between candidates. 1 2 In July, AFL-CIO
Secretary-Treasurer William Schnitzler reflected the same feeling when
he told a COPE gathering no to expect too much in the November election. 13
On August 10, George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, appeared before
the Democratic' Platform Committee with the AFL-CIO's official platform
recommendations, which were basically a 50-page summary of the COPE
Handbook. 1 4 Schnitzler had been delegated to perform the same duties
at the Republican convention, in line with labor's official "non-partisan"
goal of getting both parties to adopt pro-labor planks. 15
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The resulting platforms were presented in the AFL-CIO News, a bi-wIee ly
newspaper published by the AFL-CIO, along with a detail d analysis of
each and articles comparing them to labor's recommended platforms. 16
Thus, the stage was set for the dual processes of assessment and endorse-
ment as the Executive Council met soon after the conventions had nominated
Eisenhower and Stevenson.
Assessment
COPE undertook a thorough examination of the platforms and past records
on which both candidates for President would run, in line with the traditional
labor policy of "non-partisan" support predicated solely upon a candidate's
stand on the issues. The outcome, in terms of assessment, was never
seriously in doubt. The Democratic platform conformed in large measure
with the recommendations Meany had presented, insofar as labor-related
issues were concerned. 17 The Democrats declared for repeal of Taft-
Hartley, while the Republicans supported a series of amendments which
had been opposed by the AFL and the CIO when they were first introduced
unsuccessfully in Congress in 1953.18
In the vital area of civil rights, COPE found both platforms to be weak,
although the Demobrats were commended for proposing an end to Senate
filibustering which had been used to stall civil rights legislation. 19
This objection to the civil rights planks was to play an important role in
the debate of the Executive Council., The foreign policy and economic
planks of the Democrats were favored by COPE over those of the Republi-
cans.
2 0
The assessment of candidates involved not only a study of their public
records and statements, but also a consideration of the intangible ele-
ments of a warm relationship between labor and the White House that is
desired by labor's leaders, as Monroe Berkowitz explained in a contem-
porary publication:
Recognizing the dangers involved in generalizing, still it
might be said that on the national scale unions want a
"friendly" administration in Washington.. .one that under-
stands something of the crisis nature of collective bargain-
ing and provides a Washington platform for the dramatization
of issues. A Roosevelt or a Truman could be counted upon .
to invite deadlocked participants in a.. .dispute to the White
House... the press would publish pictures of the parties on
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the White House lawn and the rank and file were assured
that their elected leaders had carried the fight to the top.
Today (1956), the names of union leaders are not conspi-
cuous on the White House calling list...
Sometimes,.. as far as labor is concerned, it is as impor-
tant how a thing is done as what is done. 2 1
Berkowitz's comments reveal the underlying reasons for the pro-Democratic
bias of most of the big labor leaders, at least in 1956.
In evaluating the candidates themselves, COPE found that, while Eisenhower
may have had good intentions in regard to workers, when it came to
actions rather than promises the President didn't seem to follow through
as eagerly as when he was faced with a pro-business matter. He con-
sulted only infrequently with union leaders aboit-sensitive appointments
or legislation affecting labor -- such as the proposed Taft-Hartley
amendments -- and, as noted above, labor leaders just did not fuel
comfortable in the White House when visiting Eisenhower; they felt
like outsiders, intruders in some business inner sanctum. 2 2
Perhaps a bigger issue, as far as COPE was concerned, was the Vice-
Presidential candidacy of Richard M. Nixon, given the recent serious
illnesses of the President. Said COPE:
The voters must also take more seriously into account this
year... the candidates for Vice-President. If President
Eisenhower is re-elected and does not s'urvive another four
years in the White House,.. .Nixon would become President.
His record... shows that Nixon voted consistently against
measures supported by labor. 2 3
The assessment of the Democratic Presidential candidate emphasized
Stevenson's humanism, idealism, pro-labor record as Illinois governor,
and the stands he took on current issues, which were in many cases
to the left of the Democratic platform in just those areas, such as civil
rights, where labor had found the platform to be lacking. 2 4
The Vice-Presidential candidacy of Estes Kefauver was rated a distinct
plus for the Democrats. COPE described him as "consistently support(ing)
progressive measures" and "well qualified to serve as President himself,
if necessary." 2 5
From the assessment standpoint, then, COPE's conclusions were rather
obvious and clearcut: the Democratic platform was preferable to the
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Republican one, even if it was far from ideal; the Democratic candidates
were clearly superior to the Republicans in their stands on labor issues,
particularly in the case of Vice-Presidential candidates; and, as COPE
took care to point out, a remedy to labor's legislative problems would
be to elect an overwhelmingly liberal (read mostly Democratic) Congress,
which could be most effectively achieved by backing the top of the Demo-
cratic ticket. 2 6
Endorsement
COPE's ndorsement of the Democrats notwithstanding, endorsement by
the AFL-CIO remained a point of contention. The election of 1952 had
been a debacle for labor, and one might reasonably expect that the silent
ten per cent from that year's convention would have swelled into greater
opposition in 1956.
The Executive Council-met on August 27, 1956, and the immediate question
at the.meeting was not whom to endorse, but whether to make any endorse-
ment at all. 2 7 Meany, citing his disappointment with the planks of both
parties regarding civil rights, was against making an endorsement of
either ticket. 2 8 UAW President Walter Reuther, leading the new CIO
contingent, had participated actively in the Democratic convention, and
now urged an endorsement to protect labor's position with the party, and,
by implication, the Congress. 2 9 -When the question was put to a vote,
endorsement carried by 14-8.30 Eight of the pro-endorsement votes were
cast by the CIO contingent, while the AFL leaders were against the endorse-
ment 6-,8; if the merger hadn't taken place, the AFL might not have made
any endorsement in 1956.31
Once the question of whether to endorse was settled, the choice of a
candidate was clearcut, and Stevenson-Kefauver won approval by a more
decisive 17-5. Meany's announcement to the press did not, however,
convey great enthusiasm for the Democrats:
Mr. Meany seemed carefully to avoid saying that the douncil
had recommended endorse.ment of the Democratic ticket.
Instead, he always referred to the Stevenson- Kefauver
ticket. 3 2
The rationale of supporting the top of the ticket in order to strengthen
the Congressional campaign, suggested in COPE's assessment report,
was invoked by Meany as a main reason for endorsement:
31
A failure to recommend endorsement of Stevenson-
Kefauver would have had the effect of weakening
support for liberal, pro-labor candidates for the
Senate and House, in the viewpoint of the supporters
of endorsement, Meany declared. 33
The question of endorsement was submitted to the General Board on
September 12. Not surprisingly, in view of Eisenhower's rank and file
popularity, there was renewed opposition to a Stevenson endorsement,
or any endorsement at all, and Vice-President Stevenson of the Carpen-
ters spoke for total neutrality. On the final voice vote, a handful of
persistent no votes were heard. 3 4
Soon after the Executive Council announcement, many individual unions
holding conventions during the campaign months passed their own reso-
lutions for Stevenson and Kefauver, and the Democratic candidates were
invited to address several convention sessions. 3 5
The Campaign
The campaign, or at least labor's part in it, centered around the Congres-
sional races.36 Raymond Moley, a political scientist and one-time Brain
Truster, observed that labor, and not the Democratic party, was actually
running the Democratic Congressional campaign machinery:
It is worthy of note that the Eisenhower-Nixon speeches
and the activities of the Republican National Committee
give much more attention to Congressional candidates
than do Stevenson-Kefauver and the official Democratic
organization. The Democrats have virtually turned over
the campidgn for Congressional seats to COPE. Thus
the President, a strong and popular candidate, is really
fighting two parties.37
In terms of finance, the old charges of a labor slush fund were met by
statements that a financial commitment had not been made by labor when
it endorsed the Stevenson ticket; COPE money was being spread around
to individual Democratic Congressional races: 3 8
The AFL-CIO's committee (COPE) reported no donations
to the camphign funds for... Stevenson, although the
AFL-CIO...endorsed the Democratic candidate. 3 9
32
An estimated $1.8 million was collected by COPE, and of that $970,000
reportedly went to individual Congressional races, with the rest going
for general support of the Democrats, including financing of distribution
of voting records of Congressmen. 4 0 Reporting to a Senate subcommittee
headed by Senator Gore on their September outlays, COPE leaders noted
that about 70% of their spending that month went directly to Congressional
camphigns, with the remainder being spent on generalized activities like
printing and distributing the voting records noted above. 4 1 Lack of con-
fidence in the ability of the Democratic ticket to beat Eisenhower may
explain why organized labor, by some estimates, collected less in the
form of political contributions than it had in 1952.42
On the propaganda front, the AFL-CIO News was a chief means of reach-
ing the membership, and it printed analyses of campaign speeches, pro-
Stevenson editorials, and a column called "Adlai Says," excerpting the
more memorable statements from the candidate's campatgn oratory. 4 3
A main focus of the propaganda effort was against Nixon rather than the
popular Eisenhower, who was infrequently but generally respectfully
mentioned. In the issue of September 29, the News printed a large box
on page two, headed "Kefauver Right, Nixon Wrong," containing a com-
parison of the voting records of both men as Senators.44 The October
20 issue devoted a full page to several articles discussing Nixon, some
describing his campaign efforts in sarcastic tones.45
The Republican were running on the twin claims of peace and prosperity
in 1956. AFL-CIO spokesmen attempted to refute at least the latter
claim in public interviews and newspaper articles. Said COPE co-
director James McDevitt of the Eisenhower prosperity:
Well, .this picture of general prosperity is very much over-
done to say the least. There have been some very bad
spots in employment this year, like anthracite coal and
textiles, and the farm machinery industry. Such prosper-
ity we have is due first to the need for production of
defense materials and to built-in supports like' social
security, which are in the main the work of the labor
movement. And above all to labor's constant fight for
higher wage levels which sustain buying power and keep
business going. Stevens on- Kefauver want to keep labor
* strong. The Eisenhower-Nixon policies deliberately in-
tend to weaken labor. And so we endorsed Stevenson
and Kefauver. 4 6
The argument was that any existing prosperity was due to the work Qf
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twenty years by the Democrats and the continuing efforts of labor, and
the only way to get back up to "real" prosperity would be a return to
Democratic rule and labor power.
During the final weeks of the campaign, the News ran several stories
about campaigns which had been decided by a mere handful of votes,
and predicted a close race both nationally and for Congressional control.
Some articles claimed Stevenson had a good chance for election, citing
Eisenhower's late decision to enter the speechmaking rounds and Steven-
son's vigorous campaigning, probably in hopes of stimulating a large
turnout of voters who might have stayed home thinking their votes wouldn't
matter. 4 7
The results of the election were an Eisenhower landslide, a virtual repeat
of 1952, but the situation in Congress remained basically unchanged,
with the Democrats retaining a slim margin of control, and the ideological
balance resting with a coalition of Southern Democratic conservatives
and Republicans. 48
Labor Interprets the Election Results
A post-election analysIs by U.S.News and World Report concluded:
Rank and file members, by the hundreds of thousands,
voted independently of their leaders... Stevenson had
the backing of the big AFL-CIO organizations, but
President Eisenhower drew heavy support from working
men and women. 4 9
Eisenhower could not have won such an overwhelming victory without
a sizable segment of the labor vote. This was interpreted by Meany
to indicate a personal triumph for Eisenhower but a public rebuke to
the Republicans by not givinflke the Republican Congress he had asked
for:
Meany told reporters that labot's vigorous campaigning
for "liberal progressive candidates" helped the Democrats
retain control of Congress -- a development "little
.short of a miracle" in the face of the Eisenhower vote...
Statements across the country stressed that union con-
centration on Congressional and state.4 aces staved off
a Republican sweep... 50
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Thus the old rationale for supporting the top of the ticket was brushed
off and trotted out to rationalize labor's campaign tactics:
The fact that millions of union members used their ballots
for a...repudiation of the Stevenson endorsement has not
upset the conviction of most union chiefs that they did
the right thing.
Few expected that the Democratic Presidential candidate
would win. Their basic belief was that they could not
hope to run a forceful drive for the election of Congres-
sional and state candidates in a Presidential year if ihey
ignored the head of the ticket. 5 1
There was good news for'the AFL-CIO buried under the election results.
It appeared that in the few districts where COPE had been able to count
on already merged local AFL and CIO organizations, it had been very
effective. The expectation of the leaders had been that a merger would
avoid the feeling of working at cross purposes that had pervaded the'
1952 campaign. This seemed true early in the campaign, but in the tense
final weeks unity had broken down badly: 5 2
.the spectacle of unity at the top was impressive, but
highly misleading. In politics.. .most of the work is done
down at the state, city, and ward level. And down there
the spectacle of unity was less impressive. In fact, in
most cases it Just didn't exist. 53
While CIO and AFL organizations have been merged in
some states, few were states where organized labor is
an important political force. And at the grass-roots,
or shop-and-precinct, level of political action, CIO and
AFL unions for the most part worked independently or
even at cross-purposes.54
There were, however, a few districts in which mergers were an accom-
plished fact by campaign time, and in those districts, particularly in the
west, the results were good enough to give real hope for the future when
unity might be expected to pervade most levels. 5 5
A concise summary of the election results from labor's viewpoint is pro-
vided by John Cort:
Matters could have been a great deal worse.. .In fact, there
is a good deal.of evidence to show that, without Eisenhower,
labor and the Democrats would have swept to a crashing
victory on all fronts. Well, almost all fronts -- in the
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South the Democrats usually win and labor loses.,"
A less sympathetic but perhaps equally accurate summary of labor's role
was enunciated by National Association of Manufacturers President
Cola Parker, who said:
... in view of yesterday's results, I suspect they saw
the handwriting on the wall early in the game and in-
stead of contributing manpower and money to a hopeless
cause, they concentrated their efforts on congressional
and local candidates who would do their bidding 57
The evidence is that Parker was exactly right, and, furthermore, that labor
may have woh that game in 1956.
Conclusions
The united labor movement learned many lessons in the 1956 campaign
that were to serve as guidelines, or precedents, for future political
action. An important precedent set by the new confederation was the
act of endorsement itself. This was the third time in its history that
the AFL had endorsed a Presidential candidate (the first being the La-
Follette campaign in 1924), but it was the second time in as many elec-
tions, and it seemed to make firmer the outright commitment to the
Democrats made by both the AFL and the CIO in 1952.58 The vote in
the Executive Council indicated to many that the merger had the overall
effect of politically activating the AFL, rather than de-activating the
CIO, as had been feared by some in the junior organization. When it
came time to make an endorsement in 1960, the trend became clear,
as there was no opposition to the concept of taking a partisan position
in regard to Presidential politics within the Executive Council. 5 9 The
virtually automatic endorsements in 1964 and 1968 further strengthened
this tie to the Democrats. The events of the summer of 1972, however,
may signal a new phase in labor's political participation.
In addition, labor learned in 1956 that unity pays. The best results
in Congressional races had occurred in districts where there were well-
coordinated efforts, with both AFL and CIO unions contributing to a
COPE-run campaign. his was seen as an impetus to beat the 1957
convention deadline for local mergers to take place. 6 0
Early dire predictions that a Democratic presidential disaster would
gause division over political action in the labor movement 61 were
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not borne Out by the results, and in retrospect, it appears that the AFL
took an important step forward in political sophistication in 1956, using
its Presidential endorsement as a tool to get what it really wanted, a
Democratic Congress. The efficacy of the device was illustrated in an
inverse way by the election experience of the United Mine Workers.
John L. Lewis, UMW leader and a Republican at heart, decided to ig-
nore the Presidential race and concentrate his union's efforts in the coal
districts on local races. Voter turnout was small and the results were
adverse, demonstrating that the excitement of Presidential politicking
was an essential element of a sticcessful 16bor campaign. 62
The 1956 campaign was an important milestone in the story of labor and
politics, a decisive point on the road to labor's strong and unquestioned
commitment to the Democratic Party characteristic of the national politics
of the 1960s.
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